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NONMAJORITY BARGAINING 
ORDERS: THE ONLY EFFECTIVE 
REMEDY FOR PERVASIVE 
EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR 
PRACTICES DURING UNION 
ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS 
An employer learns that a union organizing campaign is un-
derway at his plant.1 He responds by discharging union activists, 
imposing stricter working conditions and higher production quo-
tas, threatening plant closure, falsifying payroll records to pre-
vent some employees from voting for the union, and engaging in 
numerous other unfair labor practices. 2 Prior to the employer's 
unfair labor practices, the union has obtained authorization 
cards3 from over forty percent of the employees, but the em-
ployer's coercive actions have irreparably damaged the union's 
organizing campaign. The union files unfair labor practice 
charges'against the employer with the National Labor Relations 
Board (the Board).• The Board admits that the possibility of 
erasing the coercive effects of the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices and ensuring a fair election by the use of traditional reme-
dies is slight. Nevertheless, although conceding their probable 
ineffectiveness, the Board orders only traditional remedies, such 
as a cease and desist order, reinstatement with back pay of 
1. This fact situation is based on Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). 
2. The five categories of employer unfair labor practices are delineated in § 8(a) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). 
3. A union circulates and collects authorization cards from employees during the 
course of a union organizing campaign. By signing one of these cards an employee autho-
rizes the union to be his or her bargaining representative. See 1 SECTION OF LABOR & 
EMPLOYMENT LAw, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 503-05 (2d ed. 1983). 
The National Labor Relations Board generally requires that at least 30% of the employ-
ees sign authorization cards before it will hold a union certification election. See 29 
C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1986). 
4. The National Labor Relations Board was established by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982). The Board's principal functions under the Act are 
(1) to conduct secret ballot elections among employees to determine whether or not they 
desire to be represented by a union and (2) to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices 
committed by either an employer or a union. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
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wrongfully discharged employees, a return to the older, more le-
nient working conditions, and the posting of a notice assuring 
the employees that the employer will commit no further unfair 
labor practices. 
Current Board policy forbids issuing a bargaining order11 in 
this situation, where there is no objective evidence of majority 
support for a union, even though the bargaining ·order may be 
the only effective remedy for extreme employer unfair labor 
practices. The Board's refusal to issue nonmajority bargaining 
orders (NMBOs),6 grounded in its fear of imposing a union on 
unwilling employees, has left it impotent to remedy the most se-
vere employer unfair labor practices. This Note examines argu-
ments for and against the Board's use of NMBOs and concludes 
that NMBOs are within the scope of the Board's remedial pow-
ers and should be issued in appropriate cases. Part I examines 
the language and legislative history of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) 7 and contends that Congress did not ex-
pressly preclude the Board from issuing NMBOs; they are, in 
fact, consistent with Congress' underlying legislative intent. Part 
II analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co. 8 and argues that the Court there sanctioned the 
Board's use of NMBOs. Part III discusses relevant policy consid-
erations and concludes that NMBOs are consistent with the 
Act's policies of effectuating employee free choice and of deter-
ring the commission of unfair labor practices by employers. 
5. The Board, pursuant to its broad§ lO(c) power to "take such affirmative action ... 
as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]," has devised the bargaining order remedy. 29 
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); see also 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, 
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 517-22 (2d ed. 1983). As its name implies, a "bargaining 
order" requires an employer to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with a union. 
6. A nonmajority bargaining order is a bargaining order that is issued by the Board 
even though there is no objective evidence that the union ever had the support of a 
majority of the employees (i.e., even though the union has not obtained authorization 
cards from a majority of the employees and has not won a certification election). An 
NMBO is appropriate in cases of outrageous and pervasive employer unfair labor prac-
tices, the coercive effects of which cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional 
remedies and have made the holding of a fair and reliable election impossible. See 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613-14 (1969). For possible additional restric-
tions on the use of NMBOs, see infra text accompanying notes 85-86. 
7. The National Labor Relations Act§§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
8. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
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A crucial consideration in the debate over the propriety of 
NMBOs is whether the Board has the statutory authority to is-
sue them-a question dividing both the Board and the courts in 
recent years. A tension exists within the Act between its funda-
mental principle of majority rule and its grant of broad remedial 
authority to the Board to ensure the exercise of employee free 
choice. Interpretations of the Act in other contexts and an ex-
amination of congressional intent, however, indicate that the 
majority rule principle is more flexible and may be subordinated 
to the Board's remedial authority to ensure employee free 
choice. Therefore, NMBOs seem to be within the scope of the 
Board's statutory authority. 
A. Division in Both the Board and the Courts 
Whether or not the Board has the authority to issue NMBOs 
has divided both the Board and the courts in recent years. In 
United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association,9 the Board re-
fused to issue an NMBO even though the employer had commit-
ted numerous flagrant unfair labor practices, including discrimi-
natory discharges, threats to close the plant, coercive 
interrogations of employees, and unprecedented cash bonuses to 
deter support for the union. 10 The Board split, with only one 
member denying the Board's authority to issue NMBOs under 
any circumstances. 11 On appeal, 12 the Third Circuit held that 
the Board has remedial authority to issue an NMBO in cases 
where the employer has committed such outrageous and perva-
sive unfair labor practices that there is no reasonable possibility 
9. 242 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1979)·. 
10. Id. at 1031. 
11. Two members of the Board stated that the Board may have the authority to issue 
NMBOs, but not in the circumstances of this case. Id. at 1027-28. One member of the 
Board felt that the Board could not issue an NMBO under any circumstances unless and 
until Congress expressly authorized such a remedy. Id. at 1042 (Member Penello, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). The other two members of the Board believed that 
an NMBO should be issued in this case and in any case where the employer's miscon-
duct rendered an accurate determination of majority support impossible. Id. at 1035 
(Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
12. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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that a free and unc;:oerced election can be held. 13 On remand, the 
Board, for the first time, issued an NMBO. 14 
The Board again issued an NMBO in Conair Corp., 111 as a 
remedy for an employer's extreme and pervasive unfair labor 
practices. The employer had made numerous threats of plant 
closure and loss of benefits, engaged in coercive interrogations of 
employees, and had unlawfully discharged striking employees. 16 
A majority of the Board, reiterating the standard endorsed by 
the Third Circuit in United Dairy Farmers, held that an NMBO 
should issue wherever an employer's unfair labor practices com-
pletely foreclosed the possibility of a fair election.17 Two mem-
bers of the Board dissented on this issue because they felt that 
the Board did not have the authority to issue NMBOs under any 
circumstances.18 On appeal,19 however, the D.C. Circuit reversed, 
holding that the Board did not have the authority, under any 
circumstances, to issue NMBOs.20 The dissent would permit 
NMBOs, at least in cases such as this one, where it was reasona-
bly likely that the union would have gained majority support in 
a coercion-free atmosphere.21 
Finally, in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 22 the Board overruled its 
Conair decision and held that it would not, under any circum-
stances, issue an NMBO. 23 One member of the Board dissented 
and, consistent with the Board's Conair decision, would have 
held the Board to have statutory authority to issue an NMBO in 
exceptional unfair labor practice cases. 24 
Both the Board and the courts have had difficulty deciding 
whether or not NMBOs are a proper remedy under the Act. The 
Board currently follows the D.C. Circuit's position that NMBOs 
are not within its remedial power, even though the Third Cir-
13. Id. at 1069. 
14. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 257 N.L.R.B. 772 (1981). The case was heard 
only by Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Zimmerman. 
15. 261 N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982). 
16. Id. at 1189-90. 
17. Id. at 1194. 
18. Id. at 1195 (Chairman Van de Water, concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 1198-99 (Member Hunter, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
19. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
20. The majority would not, "[w)ithout a clear direction from Congress, ... remedy 
one possible injustice by taking the substantial chance of imposing another." Id. at 1383. 
21. Id. at 1399 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
22. 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984). For a description of the factual situation in Gourmet 
Foods, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
23. Id. at 583. In a concurring opinion, Member Dennis stated that she would not 
issue an NMBO without clear direction from Congress. Id. at 588. 
24. Id. at 588-89 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting). 
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cuit's decision. to the contrary in United Dairy Farmers still 
stands. 211 An independent in-depth examination of the relevant 
portions of the Act is thus warranted. 
B. Tension in the Act 
NMBOs require an employer to bargain with a union in cases 
where the Board determines that the employer's "outrageous" 
and "pervasive" unfair.labor practices have made the holding of 
a fair election impossible and that the union would have won the 
election "but for" the employer's unfair labor practices. 26 Sec-
tion lO(c) of the Act empowers the Board, upon a finding that 
an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices, to "take such 
affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of [ the 
Act]."27 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Board's [sec-
tion lO(c) remedial] power is a broad discretionary one, subject 
to limited judicial review."28 A Board order will therefore be left 
undisturbed "unless it can be shown that the order is a patent 
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be 
said to effectuate the policies of the Act. "29 The policies of the 
25. Section 10(0 of the Act provides for appellate court review of Board decisions. 
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain judicial review of the 
order (1) in the Court of Appeals for the.District of Columbia or (2) in the Circuit where 
the unfair labor practice allegedly took place, where the person resides, or where the 
person transacts business. The appellate court has the power to enforce, modify, or set 
aside, in whole or in part, the order of the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1982). 
26. Most proponents of NMBOs would limit their use to situations where the Board 
reasonably determines that the union would have obtained the support of a majority of 
the employees in a coercion-free environment. See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Cam-
paign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 
HARV. L. REv. 38, 138 (1964); Golub, The Propriety of Issuing Gissel Bargaining Orders 
Where the Union Has Never Attained a Majority, 29 LAB. L.J. 631, 639-40 (1978); Com-
ment, United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Association: NLRB Bargaining Orders in the 
Absence of a Clear Showing of a Pro-Union Majority, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 851 (1980). 
By conditioning the issuance of an NMBO on the satisfaction of this "but for" test, the 
Board would best ensure compliance, at least in theory, with the Act's underlying princi-
ple of majority rule. 
27. Section lO(c) of the Act reads in relevant part: 
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the 
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in 
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and 
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person 
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative 
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will 
effectuate the policies of ·this subchapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). 
28. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964). 
29. Id. (quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1942)). 
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Act, set forth in section 1, include the encouragement of collec-
tive bargaining and the protection of employees' rights to organ-
ize and select representatives of their own choosing. 30 NMBOs 
therefore seem to fall within the Board's broad discretionary 
power under section lO(c) because, so long as applied in accor-
dance with the "but for" standard, they further the Act's policy 
of protecting employees' rights to select freely their collective 
bargaining representatives. 
One could argue, however, that NMBOs do not further, and 
indeed violate, a fundamental policy of the Act.31 Section 9(a) of 
the Act provides that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected 
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the 
employees . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees."32 Imposition of an NMBO seems to violate this 
principle of majority rule because, by definition, an NMBO is 
issued only in the absence of objective evidence of majority sup-
port for the union. The union in this situation has therefore not 
been "designated or selected" by a majority of the employees. 
The Supreme Court has limited the Board's section l0(c) reme-
dial powers when their exercise would "violate [a] fundamental 
premise on which the Act is based. "33 Legislators have stressed 
the importance of majority rule to the concept of collective bar-
gaining during the legislative debates surrounding the passage of 
30. Section 1 of the Act reads in relevant part: 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of rep-
resentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 u.s.c. § 151 (1982). 
31. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1381-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Gour-
met Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 583 (1984); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1195 
(1982) (Chairman Van de Water, concurring in part and dissenting in part); United 
Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1041 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and 
Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hunter, Conair: Minority 
Bargaining Orders Usher in 1984 at NLRB, 33 LAB. L.J. 571, 577-78 (1982); Comment, 
Gissel I Bargaining Orders: Employer Deterrence or Employee Protection?, 36 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 877, 897-900 (1984); Note, Representative Bargaining Orders: A Time for 
Change, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 950, 969 (1982). 
32. Emphasis added. Section 9(a) of the Act reads in relevant part: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining 
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall 
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment .... 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). 
33. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970). 
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the Act. s• Thus, one could conclude that NMBOs violate the 
Act's fundamental premise of majority rule and therefore fall 
outside the scope of the Board's remedial powers. 811 A more 
searching examination of the Act's majority rule principle, how-
ever, reveals that this view is erroneous. 
C. Interpretations of the Act m Other Contexts 
Although the principle of majority rule is an important policy 
of the Act, it is not inviolable and may be balanced against the 
Act's other policies.88 In a number of circumstances, neither the 
Board nor the courts require evidence of actual majority support 
for a union at all times. For example, the Board conclusively 
presumes that a union has majority support during its certifica-
tion year87 and after voluntary recognition. 88 The rationale for 
this presumption is that once a collective bargaining relationship 
34. Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the Act, stated that "democracy in industry must 
be based upon the same principles as democracy in government. Majority rule, with all 
its imperfections, is the best protection of workers' rights, just as it is the surest guaranty 
of political liberty that mankind has yet discovered." 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), re-
printed in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, 
at 2337 (1949). 
Senator Wagner also commented that "collective bargaining can be really effective 
only when workers are sufficiently solidified in their interests to make one agreement 
covering all. This is possible only by means of majority rule." Hearings on S. 1958 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1935), reprinted in 
1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1419 
(1949). 
On another occasion, Senator Wagner stated that, "collective bargaining means major-
ity rule." 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2336 (1949). 
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
36. See, e.g., Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 592 (1984) (Member Zimmer-
man, dissenting); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1193 (1982); United Dairy Farmers 
Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1028 (1979); Bok, supra note 26, at 134; Comment, 
supra note 31, at 895-96; Note, supra note 31, at 967-68. 
37. In order to give collective bargaining a chance to function and to stabilize indus-
trial relations, the Board, with Supreme Court approval, requires that a certified union's 
majority status be honored for at least one year. Absent unusual circumstances, an em-
ployer must recognize a union for the entire certification year even if it has evidence that 
the union has lost its majority status. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); 1 SEC· 
TION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 354-55 
(2d ed. 1983). . 
38. An employer may voluntarily agree to recognize a union as its employees' exclu-
sive bargaining representative if the union has majority status at the time. Such volun-
tary recognition will bar a decertification election for a reasonable time, even if the union 
subsequently loses the support of a majority of the employees. See Keller Plastics E., 
Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 583 (1966); 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW. AM. BAR Ass'N, 
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 355-57 (2d ed. 1983). 
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is established, by whatever method, it should receive a fair 
chance to function. 39 This compromise of the majority rule prin-
ciple is justified and outweighed by the fact that this presump-
tion furthers the Act's fundamental policy of encouraging collec-
tive bargaining. Similarly, although NMBOs technically may 
compromise the majority rule principle, they are justified be-
cause they further the Act's fundamental policy of protecting 
employees' rights to select freely their collective bargaining rep-
resentatives. Section 1 of the Act mentions both of these poli-
cies, but not the majority rule principle."0 Thus, NMBOs, like 
the certification year and voluntary recognition rules, should not 
be prohibited merely because they may technically compromise 
the majority rule principle. 
Other policies of the Act also outweigh the majority rule prin-
ciple. For example, the Board may order an employer to bargain 
after a union's loss of majority status if the employer has com-
mitted extensive unfair labor practices.41 Furthermore, the 
Board, without inquiry into majority status, may revoke the cer-
tification of a union as a remedy for the union's unfair labor 
practices.411 These cases demonstrate the Board's power to devise 
remedies to combat either employer or union unfair labor prac-
tices that contradict objective evidence of the apparent wishes of 
the majority of the employees. The Board's authority to remedy 
unfair labor practices appears to trump the majority rule princi-
ple. The majority rule principle should therefore not bar the use 
of NMBOs by the Board, particularly because NMBOs, by defi-
nition, are issued in cases where they are the only effective 
remedy.43 
D. Congressional Intent 
An examination of congressional intent confirms that the ma-
jority rule principle does not prohibit the use of NMBOs by the 
39. See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 100; Keller Plastics E., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. at 587. 
40. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
41. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text; see also Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 
U.S. 702 (1944) (first Supreme Court case holding a bargaining order justified when an 
employer's unfair labor practices caused the loss of a union's cardholder majority status). 
42. See Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (rescinding a union's otherwise valid certification because the 
union executed racially discriminatory contracts and administered them in a manner 
which tended to perpetuate racial discrimination in employment, an unfair labor practice 
under § 8(b)(2) of the Act). 
43. See supra note 6. 
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Board. Statements in the legislative debates surrounding the 
passage of the Act, which stressed the importance of the princi-
ple of majority rule, do not indicate that Congress intended to 
withhold the power to issue NMBOs from the Board. These 
statements show only that Congress felt that majority rule 
should be the usual mechanism by which employees choose or 
reject their union."" Congress adopted this principle to prevent 
employers from weakening or avoiding collective bargaining alto-
gether by bargaining with individuals, with company-dominated 
unions, or with unions only on the basis of proportional repre-
sentation. 411 No evidence suggests that the majority rule princi-
ple was intended to be superior to other policies embodied in the 
Act or to limit in any way the Board's section lO(c) remedial 
powers.48 
Although one could argue that section 7 of the Act prohibits 
the Board from issuing NMBOs,47 an examination of the legisla-
tive history of that section contradicts such a conclusion. Section 
7, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,48 explicitly states that 
employees "shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of 
44. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., 
dissenting). 
45. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and La-
bor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1935), reprinted in l NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1419-20 (1949); Hearings on H.R. 6288 
Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1935), reprinted in 2 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2490-92 
(1949); Debates on S. 1958 in Senate, 79 CONG. REC. 7571 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2336-37 (1949); 
see also Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1395 (Wald, J., dissenting); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 
N.L.R.B. 578, 591-92 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Recent Case, Conair 
Corp. v. NLRB: Limits on the Power of the NLRB to Remedy Employer Unfair Labor 
Practices, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 813, 826-27 (1984). 
46. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); see Recent Case, supra note 45, at 827. The situation 
here is easily distinguished from the one in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), 
where the Supreme Court stated that the Board's § lO(c) powers could not be exercised 
in such a way as to violate a fundamental premise of the Act. The fun_damental premise 
being violated in H.K. Porter was freedom of contract. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 108. 
Section 8(d) of the Act states that the obligation to engage in collective bargaining "does 
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 29 
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The Act, therefore, expressly prohibits interference with the par-
ties' freedom of contract. In addition, overwhelming evidence in the legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress intended to preclude the Board from intruding into the sub-
stantive terms of collective bargaining agreements. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 104-06. 
Thus, unlike the case with the majority rule principle, both the clear language of the Act 
and the legislative history prohibit compromising the principle of freedom of contract. 
47. See, e.g., Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1382; Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. at 
584-85 (1984); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1040-41 (1979) 
(Member Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
48. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 157 (1982)). 
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such [concerted] activities."'9 A House Report seems to indicate 
that legislators sought to preclude the Board from imposing its 
choice on the employees: the Board was to respect and enforce 
the choice actually made by the employees, whether for or 
against a union.110 The legislative history of this amendment to 
section 7, however, reveals that it was added to prevent the 
Board from condoning various forms of union coercion of em-
ployees to join concerted activities, and not to limit the Board's 
section lO(c) remedial powers.111 
Finally, although one might contend that Congress would have 
explicitly provided for exceptions to the principle of majority 
rule if any were intended, H an examination of the legislative his-
tory of the Act again contradicts such a conclusion. Congress 
made one explicit exception to the majority rule principle: sec-
tion S(f). It provides that a· construction industry employer does 
not commit an unfair labor practice by signing a collective bar-
gaining agreement with a union before the union has established 
majority employee support. 113 Because Congress did not explic-
49. Section 7 of the Act reads: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organizatio~, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain 
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be 
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title. 
29 u.s.c. § 157 (1982). 
50. This report stated that the Taft-Hartley amendment: 
assures that when the law states that employees are to have the rights guaran-
teed in section 7; the Board will be prevented from compelling employees to 
exercise such rights against their will .... In other words, when Congress grants 
to employees the right to engage in specified activities, it also means to grant 
them the right to refrain from engaging therein if they do not wish to do so. 
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947). 
51. A House Report stated that the amendment: 
provides that employees are also to have the right to refrain from joining in 
concerted activities with their fellow employees if they choose to do so. Taken in 
conjunction with the provisions of section B(b)(l) ... , wherein it is made an 
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce 
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7, it is apparent that 
many forms and varietes [sic] of concerted activities which the Board, particu-
larly in its early days, regarded as protected by the act will no longer be treated 
as having that protection, since obviously persons who engage in or support un-
fair labor practices will not enjoy immunity under the act. 
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT. 1947, at 543-44 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, this amendment to § 7 apparently was intended primarily to protect employ-
ees from union coercion, and not from remedies devised by the Board. 
52. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
53. Section 8(0 re~_ds in relevant part: 
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itly authorize an exception to the principle of majority rule as a 
remedy for gross unfair labor practices, opponents of NMBOs 
argue that they are impermissible.114 
Examination of the legislative history, however, diminishes 
the value of section 8(f) as evidence of congressional intent to 
legislate only explicit exceptions to the principle of majority 
rule. 1111 The congressional reports reveal that Congress considered 
section 8(f) consistent with, and not an exception to, the major-
ity rule principle.118 Thus, because Congress did not expressly en-
act any substantive exceptions to the majority rule principle, 
section 8(f) provides no real evidence of an intention to bar any 
i~plicit exceptions to the rule. 
On the contrary, one can argue that when Congress wanted to 
limit the Board's authority it did so explicitly.117 For example, 
section 9(b) expressly limits the Board's authority to designate 
bargaining units when certain types of employees are involved.118 
Because Congress did not expressly limit the Board's broad and 
discretionary section lO(c) remedial powers, no congressional in-
tent to prohibit the Board from issuing NMBOs appears to 
exist. 
It shall not be an unfair labor practice ... for an employer engaged primarily in 
the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employ-
ees engaged ... in the building and construction industry with a labor organiza-
tion of which building and ·construction employees are members [because] the 
majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the 
provisions of [§ 9 of this Act] prior to the making of such agreement .... 
29 u.s.c. § 158(0 (1982). 
54. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
55. See Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1396 (Wald, J., dissenting); Recent Case, supra 
note 45, at 828-29. 
56. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1959). Employment relationships in 
the construction industry are generally too brief to allow a representation election to be 
held. Construction industry employers, however, typically hire from union halls where a 
majority are union members. Therefore, a majority of the workers will have already ex-
pressed their support for the union, making the § 8(0 "exception" to the principle of 
majority rule consistent with it. 
57. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1394 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., 
dissenting). 
58. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). This section prevents the Board from designating as a 
bargaining unit a group of both professional and nonprofessional employees, unless a 
majority of the professional employees votes to be included in the unit. It also prevents 
the Board from designating a bargaining unit to include, together with other employees, 
guards hired to protect the employer's interests. See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 
U.S. 99 (1970), discussed supra note 46 (holding that the Board had no authority to 
compel agreement on substantive terms of a contract because § 8(d) of the Act expressly 
prohibits this practice). 
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II. SUPREME COURT APPROVAL 
The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly de-
cided whether or not NMBOs are within the Board's remedial 
powers.119 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,60 however, the Court, 
in dicta, referred to the Board's possible use of NMBOs. The 
favorable manner in which they were discussed indicates at least 
implicit Court approval of NMBOs. 
In Gissel, the issue before the Court was whether or not a bar-
gaining order was an appropriate remedy in cases where objec-
tive evidence of a union's majority status61 once existed but sub-
sequently had been dissipated by ·extensive employer unfair 
labor practices. The Court held that this type of bargaining or-
der, now known as a "Gissel bargaining order," is an appropriate 
remedy when the employer's unfair labor practices have made a 
fair election unlikely.62 The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, 
which had held that authorization cards were unreliable indica-
tors of employee sentiment and that, in effect, the Board could 
issue a bargaining order only after the union had won a certifica-
tion election.63 The Court, however, noted that the area of disa-
59. See 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW 517-22 (2d ed. 1983). 
60. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel was a consolidation of four cases. Three of these cases 
were appealed from the Fourth Circuit: NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th 
Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); and General Steel Prods. 
v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968). In these cases, the Fourth Circuit refused to 
enforce bargaining orders issued by the Board. The employers had committed unfair 
labor practices and had refused to bargain with the union when presented with union 
authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees. Nevertheless, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the employers had not violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to bargain 
with the union, on the ground that authorization cards were such unreliable indicators of 
the desires of the employees that an employer was justified in withholding recognition 
pending the result of a certification election. The fourth case was appealed from the 
First Circuit: NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). In this case, the First 
Circuit upheld a bargaining order issued by the Board under circumstances very similar 
to the Fourth Circuit cases. 
61. A union has objective evidence of majority status when it collects signed union 
authorization cards from a majority of the employees. See supra note 3. 
62. The Court held that because authorization cards can be reliable evidence that the 
union once had majority status, a bargaining order, by restoring the status quo, is a 
permissible remedy for employer unfair labor practices likely to have dissipated this ma-
jority and impeded the election process. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 606-07, 614. 
63. Id. at 585-86. The Fourth Circuit also indicated that a bargaining order might be 
appropriate in cases where the union's majority status was otherwise undisputed. Fur-
thermore, NMBOs may be issued. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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greement between its position and that of the Fourth Circuit 
was not large as a practical matter.6 ' 
The Fourth Circuit had left open the possibility of imposing 
an NMBO in exceptional cases. These extreme cases would be 
marked by outrageous and pervasive employer unfair labor prac-
tices, the effects of which could not be eliminated by the appli-
cation of traditional remedies, thus making a fair and reliable 
election unlikely.611 The area of disagreement between the Su-
preme Court and the Fourth Circuit-whether authorization 
cards constituted sufficient evidence of a pro-union majority to 
support a bargaining order66-was not large as a practical matter 
because the Fourth Circuit had left open the possibility of im-
posing an NMBO. An NMBO, like a Gissel bargaining order, 
would be issued even though the union had never won a certifi-
cation election. Therefore, the Supreme Court, by citing the 
Fourth Circuit's tentative approval of NMBOs to demonstrate 
that their views really were not that far apart, appeared to sanc-
tion the Board's use of NMBOs.67 
Further support for this argument may be found in two other 
passages in Gissel. First, the Court noted that the employer's 
unfair labor practices in the Sinclair case, 68 one of the four cases 
consoiidated in Gissel, were so coercive that a bargaining order 
would have been necessary to repair their unlawful effects even 
in the absence of a section 8(a)(5) violation.69 At the time of the 
64. The Court stated that "(d]espite our reversal of the Fourth Circuit below ... on 
all major issues, the actual area of disagreement between our position here and that of 
the Fourth Circuit is not large as a practical matter." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613. 
65. The Court explained: 
While refusing to validate the general use of a bargaining order in reliance on 
cards, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless left open the possibility of imposing a 
bargaining order, without need of inquiry into majority status on the basis of 
cards or otherwise, in "exceptional" cases marked by "outrageous" and "perva-
sive" unfair labor practices. Such an order would be an appropriate remedy for 
those practices ... if they are of "such a nature that their coercive effects cannot 
be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with the result that a 
fair and reliable election cannot be had." 
Id. at 613-14 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 
F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
66. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 31, at 889; Comment, supra note 26, at 844-45; 
Note, supra note 31, at 967. But see, e.g., Golub, supra note 26, at 636-37; Hunter, supra 
note 31, at 576-77. 
68. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). 
69. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 615 (1969). Section 8(a)(5) provides 
that "[i)t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of -
[§ 9(a)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). For a discussion of § 9(a) and its implications, 
see supra notes 32-58 and accompanying text. 
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Gissel decision, a union established a section 8(a)(5) violation, in 
this context, by showing that it had achieved majority status 
and that the employer had rejected its bargaining request in bad 
faith. 70 A showing that the employer had committed serious un-
fair labor practices which tended to interfere with the election 
process,71 an element clearly present in the Sinclair case, satis-
fied the bad faith requirement. In fact, precisely because this el-
ement was so strong, the Court believed that no section 8(a)(5) 
violation was necessary to justify a bargaining order. 72 The 
Court thus suggested that the other element, achieving majority 
status, was not required and, therefore, that an NMBO would 
have been proper in the Sinclair case.73 
Second, the Gissel Court indicated the seriousness of its en-
dorsement of NMBOs immediately following its approval of the 
Fourth Circuit's statements leaving open the possibility of issu-
ing NMBOs.74 The Court added that, "[t]he Board itself ... has 
long had a similar policy of issuing a bargaining order, in the 
absence of a § 8(a)(5) violation or even a bargaining demand, 
when that was the only available, effective remedy for substan-
tial unfair labor practices."711 The Court referred to the policy of 
issuing a bargaining order when an employer's unfair labor prac-
tices had undermined a union's cardholder majority, even 
though the employer had not violated the duty to bargain with 
the union. 76 In other words, the Board had placed great weight 
on the remedial policies of the Act and had regularly issued bar-
gaining orders in cases of severe employer unfair labor practices, 
even when the union had never won a certification election. The 
same emphasis on the remedial policies of the Act underlies 
NMBOs, and the Court, by analogizing to this accepted Board 
70. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 582-83. 
71. See id. at 594; 1 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 497-98 (2d ed. 1983). 
72. The Court noted that, in Sinclair, the employer's threats of reprisal were so coer-
cive that the Board "did not have to make the determination called for in [cases involv-
ing less severe unfair labor practices] that the risks that a fair rerun election might not 
be possible were too great to disregard the desires of the employees already expressed 
through the cards." Gissel, 395 U.S. at 615. 
73. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, J., dis-
senting); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 590 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dis-
senting); Comment, supra note 31, at 890. But see Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 
578, 585 n.43 (1984); Comment, supra note 31, at 891 (arguing that the Court was dis-
pensing with the bad faith requirement, not the cardholder majority requirement). 
74. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
75. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969). 
76. The Gissel Court expressly cited J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479 (10th 
Cir. 1967) and United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967) as examples 
of this Board policy. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614. 
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practice, appeared also in this way to sanction the Board's use of 
NMBOs. 77 
Disagreement persists, however, as to the extent to which the 
Court endorsed NMBOs in Gissel. Some have argued that the 
Court's statements in Gissel regarding NMBOs are mere dicta78 
and therefore should not be given much weight.79 Furthermore, 
the Court expressly limited its holding to bargaining orders 
where, as in the case before it, the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices were less severe, and a cardholder majority at one time had 
been shown.80 This argument fails to recognize, however, that 
Supreme Court dicta play an important role in shaping public 
policy. The Board and the lower courts often look to the Court's 
dicta for guidance. 81 In fact, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all inter-
preted Gissel as implicitly endorsing NMBOs. 82 It is therefore 
likely that the Court carefully considered its statements regard-
ing NMBOs and the probable impact they would have in guiding 
future Board policy. 
77. See Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 590 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); 
Comment, supra note 26, at 845. But see Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1380 n.83 (arguing 
that this statement shows the Court's reference to NMBOs to be only casual). 
78. The union had been able to show that it had obtained a cardholder majority at 
one time in all four of the cases consolidated in Gissel. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 580, 587. The 
Court's statements concerning NMBOs may therefore be regarded as dicta. 
79. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Gourmet 
Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 585 (1984); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 
N.L.R.B. 1026, 1039 (1979) (Member Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Hunter, supra note 31, at 577; Comment, supra note 31, at 889-90, 894; Note, supra note 
31, at 969 n.98. 
80. The Court stated, "The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's 
use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices 
which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede 
the election processes." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969). 
81. Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 589 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting). 
82. See, e.g., NLRB v. Windsor Indus., 730 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1984); Ona Corp. v. 
NLRB, 729 F.2d 713, 720 (11th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Maidsville Coal Co., 693 F.2d 1119, 
1121-22 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 693 (7th 
Cir. 1982); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1066 (3d Cir. 
1980); Chromalloy Mining & Minerals Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1129 (5th Cir. 
1980); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. 
Lou De Young's Mkt. Basket, Inc., 430 F.2d 912, 914 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Conair 
Corp., 721 F.2d at 1381 (concluding that the most that can be said is that the Gissel 
Court left open the NMBO issue). United Dairy Farmers and Conair Corp. are the only 
cases that discuss in depth the reasoning behind their interpretations of the Gissel dic-
tum. The arguments advanced in these cases have been discu5!led throughout Part II of 
this Note. For a discussion of the relationship between the Board and the federal courts, 
see supra note 25. 
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III. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
NMBOs, in addition to being consistent with the language, 
legislative history, and Supreme Court interpretations of the 
Act, further the Act's underlying policy goals. 83 NMBOs help 
both to ensure employee freedom of choice and to deter em-
ployer unfair labor practices. 
A. Employee Freedom of Choice 
When an employer's outrageous and pervasive unfair labor 
practices are so coercive as to make a fair and reliable election 
impossible, the true wishes of the majority of the employees re-
main indeterminate. 84 Through the careful application of the 
NMBO remedy, however, the Board should be able to predict 
with reasonable accuracy and effectuate what the true uncoerced 
wishes of the majority of the employees would have been "but 
for" the employer's unfair labor practices. The Board could de-
velop guidelines in two areas to ensure that it applies the 
NMBO remedy in a manner most consistent with the Act's pol-
icy of effectuating employee free choice. First, the Board should 
issue NMBOs only in cases involving certain types of highly co-
ercive employer unfair labor practices, such as discriminatory 
discharges or clear threats of retaliation.811 By restricting the use 
of NMBOs to remedy only those employer unfair labor practices 
likely to have led to a significant loss of support for the union, 
the Board would ensure that the remedy addresses an actual loss 
of employee support for the union caused by the employer's un-
fair labor practices. Second, NMBOs should be issued only in 
cases where the union can show that a substantial proportion, 
perhaps thirty percent, of the employees had signed authoriza-
tion cards prior to the employer's unfair labor practices.86 By 
83. These policy goals are set forth in § 1 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see 
supra note 30. 
84. Because the employer's unfair labor practices have interfered with the free ex-
pression of the employees' views, no objective evidence exists of what the employees' 
true wishes regarding union representation would have been "but for" the employer's 
coercive actions. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1399-1400 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(Wald, J., dissenting); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1193 (1982); United Dairy Farm-
ers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1034 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jen-
kins, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bok, supra note 26, at 138. 
85. See Bok, supra note 26, at 138. 
86. Id. 
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restricting the use of NMBOs to cases where the union at one 
time had achieved significant employee support, the Board 
would help ensure that a majority of the employees would have 
supported the union "but for" the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices and, therefore, that the NMBO is consistent with the Act's 
policy of effectuating employee free choice. 
One empirical study, the "Getman study,"87 purports to show 
that employer unfair labor practices have no significant impact 
on employee votes in union certification elections. 88 If this 
study's conclusions are true, then a strong argument could be 
made that NMBOs not only are unnecessary but also would con-
sistently interfere with employee free choice. 89 The Getman 
study has been severely criticized,90 however, and its data have 
even been used to support the opposite conclusion, that em-
ployer unfair labor practices significantly reduce the pro-union 
vote. 91 In addition, another independent study found employer 
unfair labor practices to have a pronounced negative effect on 
union organizing and on the ultimate election outcome. 92 Thus, 
because employer unfair labor practices are likely to have a ma-
terial impact on employee votes, NMBOs remain a necessary re-
87. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND REALITY (1976). 
88. This study analyzed 31 union certification elections and concluded that employer 
unfair labor practices do not persuade employees to vote against union representation. 
The authors therefore suggest the elimination of the bargaining order as a remedy for 
unlawful election campaigning by employers. Id. at 154. Cf. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation 
and Union Representation, 38 STAN. L. REv. 957, 981-88 (1986) (arguing that a decision 
to unionize is influenced significantly more by general economic conditions than by em-
ployer unfair labor practices). 
89. A union loses a certification election, according to the Getman study's view, be-
cause most of the. employees truly do not want to be, and never did want to be, repre-
sented by the union. An NMBO therefore would impose a union on the employees 
against their true wishes. See Recent Decision, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 780, 797 (1981) 
(discussing United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB). 
90. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization 
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1782-87 (1983) (contending that the Getman 
study actually showed that employer unfair labor practices reduced the pro-union vote, 
though the study's authors claimed that these results were statistically insignificant, and 
further arguing that the study's research methods were flawed). 
91. One analyst used this data to estimate that severe employer unfair labor practices 
reduced the number of pro-union votes by 15 percent. W. Dickens, Union Representa-
tion Elections: Campaign and Vote (Oct. 1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Depart-
ment of Economics, Massachusetts Inst. of Technology) (cited in Weiler, supra note 90, 
at 1784-86 & nn.50-55, 59-60). 
92. These researchers found that unlawful employer opposition, as measured by the 
average number of unfair labor practice charges filed against employers per election, had 
a significant negative effect on union organizing. D. ELLWOOD & G. FINE, THE IMPACT OF 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON UNION ORGANIZING (National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No. 1116, 1983) (cited in Weiler, supra note 90, at 1786 n.61). 
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medial device and, if carefully applied by the Board, would fur-
ther the Act's policy of ensuring employee freedom of choice. 
Even if the Board occasionally errs in its calculations, how-
ever, and orders an employer to bargain with a union that would 
not have had the support of a majority of the employees, the 
adverse effects on employee freedom of choice would be mini-
maL First, it is quite unlikely that an NMBO would have the 
effect of forcing any employee to join the union against his will. 
Employees would be compelled to join a union only if a union 
security clause93 is negotiated. But a union is unlikely to be able 
to pressure an employer who violates the law to resist unioniza-
tion into making this significant concession.94 Second, NMBOs 
are only temporary and, after a reasonable period of time has 
passed, the employees are free to vote out the union.011 Finally, it 
is quite likely that the union will try to negotiate a contract sat-
isfactory to the majority of the employees, because it will have 
to win their support in order to survive as their exclusive repre-
sentative in the long-term.96 
Furthermore, NMBOs do not interfere with employee free 
choice significantly more than do Gissel bargaining orders, 
which have the Supreme Court's explicit approval.97 Even where 
a cardholder majority at one time has been shown, opinions or 
the composition of the workforce may have changed since the 
cards were signed and collected; employees may have signed the 
cards in a "go along" mood, with the intent later to cast a secret 
ballot the other way; or some of the employees may have misun-
derstood the effect of signing the cards.98 The fact that the 
union at one time had a cardholder majority, the only relevant 
factor distinguishing a Gissel bargaining order from an NMBO, 
93. A union security clause requires all employees covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, as a condition of employment, to obtain and maintain membership in the 
union. See 2 SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N, THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAw 1365 (2d ed. 1983). 
94. Bok, supra note 26, at 135. 
95. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969) ("There is, after all, 
nothing permanent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of the employer's acts 
have worn off, the employees clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by filing 
a representation petition."); Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(Wald, J., dissenting); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 592 & nn. 27-28 (1984) 
(Member Zimmerman, dissenting); Golub, supra note 26, at 640; Note, supra note 31, at 
968. 
96. Bok, supra note 26, at 135; see also Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 592 (Mem-
ber Zimmerman, dissenting). 
97. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
98. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1034 (1979) (Chair-
man Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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thus is not necessarily a significant.indi~lltor of what the current 
employee voting preference would have been "but for" the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. 99 Therefore, NMBOs appear to 
offer no less protection to employee free choice than Gissel bar-
gaining orders, which have attained widespread acceptance. 100 
Finally, whatever minimal harm NMBOs may occasionally 
work on employee free choice is outweighed by the fact that they 
are the only effective remedy for severe employer unfair labor 
practices. By definition, NMBOs are issued only in cases where 
the "coercive effects [of employer unfair labor practices] cannot 
be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with 
the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had."101 
Traditional remedies are likely to be ineffective in these more 
serious cases because "there are many workers whose apprehen-
sions cannot be allayed by notices posted in the plant or by the 
possibility of reinstatement and backpay at some future 
date."102 Some have argued that other extraordinary remedies, 
particularly the section lO(j) injunction,1°3 would be just as ef-
fective as NMBOs.10• The section lO(j) injunction, however, is a 
doubtful alternative to NMBOs, especially considering the 
courts' reluctance to grant them and the historical practice of 
issuing injunctive relief during organizing campaigns only on a 
-99. Cf. Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel 
Decision, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 87, 137 (1984) (concluding that authorization cards from at 
least 62.5% of the employees were needed before the union stood a better than even 
chance of actually winning the representation election). 
100. But see, e.g., Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 584-85 (1984); Conair 
Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1196-97 (1982) (Chairman Van de Water, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); Hunter, supra note 31, at 577-78; Comment, supra note 31, at 
913-14; Recent Decision, supra note 89, at 798. These administrators and authors con-
tend that NMBOs, unlike Gissel bargaining orders, do not restore the status quo. There-
fore, strictly speaking, NMBOs are not a remedial measure, but a punitive measure, and 
arguably are outside the scope of the Board's authority. 
101. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969) (quoting NLRB v. S.S. 
Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967)). 
102. Bok, supra note 26, at 135-36. 
103. Section lO(j) of the Act provides that "[t]he Board shall have power ... to 
petition [a) United States district court ... for appropriate temporary relief or re-
straining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court ... shall have jurisdiction 
to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and 
proper." 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982). · 
104. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 31, at 579-80; Note, supra note 31, at 970; Recent 
Decision, supra note 89, at 799-800; cf. Note, Remedial Gap at the NLRB Following the 
Demise of the Nonmajority Bargaining Order: Gourmet Foods, Inc. and Warehouse Em-
ployees, Local 503, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1193, 1208-17 (1985) (suggesting alternative reme-
dial devices to be applied by the Board assuming the NMBO remedy never again will be 
available). 
636 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 20:2 
showing of a card majority.1011 Therefore, NMBOs appear to be 
the only effective way to remedy severe employer unfair labor 
practices. On balance, they best ensure employee freedom of 
choice in these situations.106 
B. Deterrence of Employer Unfajr Labor Practices 
A second policy goal that NMBOs further is the deterrence of 
employer unfair labor practices. The threat of having an NMBO 
imposed should create a strong incentive for an anti-union em-
ployer to keep his opposition to the union within the law. If he 
does not do so, he may b~ forced to bargain with the union any-
way, even if his unfair labor practices successfully keep the 
union from winning the election or obtaining a cardholder ma-
jority.107 On the other hand, in the absence of the threat of an 
NMBO, an anti-union employer may risk committing serious 
unfair labor practices at the first signs of unionization, so as to 
prevent the union from acquiring a cardholder majority and 
thereby ensure that he will never be subject to a bargaining 
order.108 
105. See Recent Case, supra note 45, at 832 & n.125. 
106. See, e.g., Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1396-97 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wald, 
J., dissenting); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1068 (3d Cir. 
1980); Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 594 (1984) (Member Zimmerman, dissent-
ing); Conair Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1194 (1982); Bok, supra note 26, at 138 & n.274; 
Recent Case, supra note 45, at 831-32. 
107. Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1400 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("The prospect of a reme-
dial bargaining order should create a strong incentive for the anti-union employer to 
keep its campaign within legal limits. For even if the company wins the organizational 
battle, it may lose the collective bargaining war."); see also Gourmet Foods, 270 
N.L.R.B. at 593 (Member Zimmerman, dissenting); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 
242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1037-38 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); Bok, supra note 26, at 133. 
108. If the Board is not allowed to issue NMBOs: 
The anti-union employer can avoid ever dealing with a union by rushing in at 
the first sign of union sentiment, before employees have begun to experience the 
collective strength of numbers, with threats of plant closings, mass discharges 
and close surveillance, thereby creating an atmosphere of coercion that outlasts 
the tenure of current employees and outdistances the remedial powers of the 
Board. 
Conair Corp., 721 F.2d at 1400 (Wald, J., dissenting). In addition: 
If the Board could enter only a cease-and-desist order and direct an election or a 
rerun, it would in effect he rewarding the employer and allowing him "to profit 
from [his) own wrongful refusal to bargain," while at the same time severely 
curtailing the employees' right freely to determine whether they desire a repre-
sentative. The employer could continue to delay or disrupt the election processes 
and put off indefinitely his obligation to bargain; and any election held under 
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Although one could argue that NMBOs are an ineffective rem-
edy, and therefore that their deterrent effect would prove to be 
illusory, the experience with the bargaining order in general of-
fers strong evidence· to the contrary. Those who contend that 
NMBOs are ineffective remedies point out that NMBOs cannot 
compel a recalcitrant employer to make any concessions or agree 
to a contract.109 In addition, the employees probably would be 
unable to utilize the strike weapon, because employees who are 
too intimidated to vote for the union in a secret ballot election 
would be unlikely to vote to go on strike. 110 Therefore, they con-
clude, because NMBOs are unlikely to produce viable and en-
during collective bargaining relationships, employers would have 
no real incentive to avoid them. 111 Past experience with the bar-
gaining order remedy in general, however, suggests that such an 
incentive indeed exists. Employers have fought the bargaining 
order remedy with considerable tenacity, indicating that they 
consider the possibility of meaningful bargaining to be substan-
tial.112 Therefore, the threat of an NMBO may effectively deter 
employer unfair labor practices and possibly even result in long-
lasting collective bargaining relationships. 
CONCLUSION 
Under current Board policy no effective remedy exists for per-
vasive employer unfair labor practices during a union organizing 
campaign. Traditional Board remedies often cannot fully elimi-
nate the coercive effects of these extreme unfair labor practices. 
Particularly when a union has come close to obtaining a card-
these circumstances would not be likely to demonstrate the employees' true, un-
distorted desires. 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-11 (1969) (citation and footnotes omit-
ted) (quoting Franks Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944)); see also United Dairy 
Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 633 F.2d at 1068-69; Gourmet Foods, 270 N.L.R.B. at 593 (Mem-
ber Zimmerman, dissenting); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 
1037 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Golub, supra note 26, at 637-38; Note, supra note 31, at 968 & n.93. 
109. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). 
110. Cf. Weiler, supra note 90, at 1794-95 (discussing the alleged ineffectiveness of 
Gissel bargaining orders). 
111. See id. at 1795; Hunter, supra note 31, at 580. A statistical study concluded that 
Gissel bargaining orders have less than a 10% chance of producing a lasting collective 
bargaining relationship. R. O'Shea, Gissel Bargaining Orders (May 1982) (unpublished 
LL.M. thesis available in Harvard Law School Library) (cited in Weiler, supra note 90, 
at 1795 n.94). 
112. See Bok, supra note 26, at 137. 
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holder majority, the employer's unfair labor practices may have 
been sufficient to deter enough pro-union votes so as to defeat a 
union that would have won a representation election in a coer-
cion-free environment. 
Board acceptance and careful application of the NMBO rem-
edy would largely solve this problem. The bargaining order 
would, by definition, erase the effects of employer unfair labor 
practices that have caused a union to lose a certification elec-
tion. The Act's broad grant of remedial power to the Board, 
combined with the flexibility of the majority rule principle, is 
sufficient to support the Board's statutory authority to issue 
NMBOs. The Supreme Court's implicit approval of NMBOs in 
Gissel strengthens this view. Furthermore, NMBOs, if carefully 
applied, would further the Act's policy of effectuating employee 
free choice and, in addition, be likely to deter employer unfair 
labor practices in the first place. 
The Board, therefore, should reverse its current policy and be-
gin issuing bargaining orders when it determines that a union 
would have won a cer_tification election "but for" the employer's 
unfair labor practices. In making this determination, the Board 
should take into account both the severity of the employer's un-
fair labor practices and objective evidence of the extent of union 
support among the employees prior to the employer's unfair la-
bor practices. In addition, the Supreme Court, in order to re-
solve the current confusion in this area, should explicitly ap-
prove the Board's use of NMBOs at the next available 
opportunity. 
-David S. Skillman 
